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Abstract 
[Excerpt] This study is a comprehensive analysis of employer behavior in representation elections 
supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The data for this study originate from a 
thorough review of primary NLRB documents for a random sample of 1,004 NLRB certification elections 
that took place between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003 and from an in-depth survey of 562 
campaigns conducted with that same sample. Employer behavior data from prior studies conducted over 
the last 20 years are used for purposes of comparison. The representativeness of the sample combined 
with the high response rate for both the survey (56%) and NLRB unfair labor practice (ULP) charge 
documents (98%) ensure that the findings provide unique and highly credible information. In combination, 
the results provide a detailed and well-documented portrait of the legal and illegal tactics used by 
employers in NLRB representational elections and of the ineffectiveness of current labor law policy to 
protect and enforce workers rights in the election process. 
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Executive summary
Th is study is a comprehensive analysis of employer behavior in representation elections supervised by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB). Th e data for this study originate from a thorough review of primary NLRB documents for a 
random sample of 1,004 NLRB certifi cation elections that took place between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003 
and from an in-depth survey of 562 campaigns conducted 
with that same sample. Employer behavior data from 
prior studies conducted over the last 20 years are used 
for purposes of comparison. Th e representativeness of the 
sample combined with the high response rate for both 
the survey (56%) and NLRB unfair labor practice (ULP) 
charge documents (98%) ensure that the fi ndings provide 
unique and highly credible information. In combination, 
the results provide a detailed and well-documented 
portrait of the legal and illegal tactics used by employers 
in NLRB representational elections and of the ineff ec-
tiveness of current labor law policy to protect and enforce 
workers rights in the election process.
 Highlights of the study regarding employer tactics in 
representational elections include:
• In the NLRB election process in which it is standard 
practice for workers to be subjected to threats, inter-
rogation, harassment, surveillance, and retaliation for 
union activity. According to our updated fi ndings, 
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employers threatened to close the plant in 57% of elections, discharged workers in 34%, and threatened to cut wages 
and benefi ts in 47% of elections. Workers were forced to attend anti-union one-on-one sessions with a supervisor 
at least weekly in two-thirds of elections. In 63% of elections employers used supervisor one-on-one meetings to 
interrogate workers about who they or other workers supported, and in 54% used such sessions to threaten workers. 
• In combination, our survey and ULP fi ndings reveal that employer opposition has intensifi ed: the incidence of 
elections in which employers used 10 or more tactics more than doubled compared to the three earlier periods we 
studied, and the nature of campaigns has changed so that the focus is on more coercive and punitive tactics designed 
to intensely monitor and punish union activity. 
• Many of these same tactics have been key elements of employer anti-union campaigns that we have studied for the 
last 20 years.1 Although the use of management consultants, captive audience meetings, and supervisor one-on-ones 
has remained fairly constant, there has been an increase in more coercive and retaliatory tactics (“sticks”) such as 
plant closing threats and actual plant closings, discharges, harassment and other discipline, surveillance, and altera-
tion of benefi ts and conditions. At the same time, employers are less likely to off er “carrots,” as we see a gradual 
decrease in tactics such as granting of unscheduled raises, positive personnel changes, promises of improvement, 
bribes and special favors, social events, and employee involvement programs. 
• Unions fi led unfair labor practice charges in 39% of the survey sample and 40% of the NLRB election sample. Th e 
survey and NLRB documents both show that the most aggressive employer anti-union behavior—that is, the highest 
percentage of allegations—were threats, discharges, interrogation, surveillance, and wages and benefi ts altered for 
union activity. 
• Th e character of the process in the private sector is illuminated by survey data from the public-sector campaigns, 
which describe an atmosphere where workers organize relatively free from the kind of coercion, intimidation, and 
retaliation that so dominates in the private sector. Most of the states in our public-sector sample have card check 
certifi cation as the primary means through which workers are organizing, where the employer is required to recognize 
the union if the majority of workers sign cards authorizing the union to represent them.
Highlights of the study regarding NLRB ULP charges include: 
• Twenty-three percent of all ULP charges and 24% or more of serious charges—such as discharges for union activity, 
interrogation, and surveillance—were fi led before the petition for an election was fi led, and 16% were fi led more 
than 30 days before the election petition was fi led. Th ese data confi rm that employer campaigning, including the 
employer free speech provision, does not depend on a petition to kick into eff ect.
Forty-fi ve percent of ULP charges resulted in a “win” for the union: either the employer settled the charges or the • 
NLRB or the courts issued a favorable decision.
• Th irty-seven percent of ULP charges result in the issuance of a complaint by the NLRB. Twenty-six percent are 
withdrawn by the union prior to the complaint being issued, and 23% are found to have no merit. Just under a third 
of all charges are resolved in whole or in part at the settlement level with 14% settling before the complaint is issued, 
with 18% settling after the complaint but before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearing process is complete. 
Th e content of the settlements is very similar except that settlements prior to merit determination are less likely to 
include reinstatement than those settled after the complaint. 
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• Employers tend to appeal most ALJ decisions, particularly Gissel bargaining orders and orders for second elections. 
Th is means that in the most egregious cases the employer is able to ensure that the case is delayed by three to fi ve 
years, and in all the cases in our sample the worst penalty an employer had to pay was back pay, averaging a few 
thousand dollars per employee.
• Our fi ndings and previous research suggest that unions are fi ling ULPs in fewer than half the elections for three main 
reasons: fi ling charges where the election is likely to be won could delay the election for months if not years; workers 
fear retaliation for fi ling charges, especially where the election is likely to be lost; and the weak remedies, lengthy delays, 
and the numerous rulings where ALJ recommendations for reinstatement, second elections, and bargaining orders have 
then been overturned, delayed, or never enforced, have diminished trust that the system will produce a remedy.
In 2007 there were only 1,510 representation elections and only 58,376 workers gained representation through the 
NLRB. Even for those who do win the election, 52% are still without a contract a year later, and 37% are still without a 
contract two years after an election. Yet researchers such as Freeman (2007) are showing that workers want unions now 
more than at any other time in the last three decades. Our fi ndings suggest that the aspirations for representation are 
being thwarted by a coercive and punitive climate for organizing that goes unrestrained due to a fundamentally fl awed 
regulatory regime that neither protects their rights nor provides any disincentives for employers to continue disregarding 
the law. Moreover, many of the employer tactics that create a punitive and coercive atmosphere are, in fact, legal. Unless 
serious labor law reform with real penalties is enacted, only a fraction of the workers who seek representation under the 
National Labor Relations Act will be successful. If recent trends continue, then there will no longer be a functioning legal 
mechanism to eff ectively protect the right of private-sector workers to organize and collectively bargain.
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In a nation where union density stands at 12.4%, it is 
easy to forget that the majority of U.S. workers want 
unions. In fact, more workers would choose to be 
unionized if given the opportunity than at any time in 
the last 30 years. According to Richard Freeman (2007) 
the percent of the non-managerial workforce who say 
they would vote for a union has been steadily increasing 
from 30% in the early 1980s, to almost 40% in the 
mid-1990s, reaching 53% in 2005. Based on his esti-
mates, if all workers who wanted a union were actually 
given the opportunity they desired, then as of 2005 
union density would have been as high as 58% (BLS 
2007; Freeman 2007). Yet, in 2009, the overwhelming 
majority of workers who want unions do not have 
them. The majority also believes that, due to employer 
opposition, they would be taking a great risk if they 
were to organize (Hart 2007). For these workers, the 
right to organize and bargain collectively—free from 
coercion, intimidation, and retaliation—is at best a 
promise indefinitely deferred.
 Since the rise of the union-avoidance industry in 
the 1970s (Smith 2003), we have witnessed a signifi cant 
increase in the intensity and aggressiveness with which 
private-sector employers have opposed organizing eff orts 
in their fi rms. As companies have globalized and re-
structured, corporate anti-union strategies have become 
more sophisticated, through resorting to implied or real 
threats of ownership change, outsourcing, or contracting 
out in response to nearly every organizing campaign (Bron-
fenbrenner 1994; 2000; Compa 2004; Logan 2006). 
 Th e combination of deregulation, investor-centered 
trade and investment policies, and an underfunded 
and disempowered National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) appears to have emboldened employers to act 
with increasing disregard for the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA). Long-time “union free” companies 
such as Wal-Mart, Coverall North America, and Cintas 
have been able to accelerate their anti-union efforts 
on multiple fronts because of the dysfunction and 
ineffectiveness of our labor law regime (Ruckelshaus 
2007; Compa 2004). As labor historian Nelson Lich-
tenstein (2008, 1,492) explains, between 1998 and 
2003 unions filed 288 unfair labor practices against 
Wal-Mart alone: 
Th ese included forty-one charges claiming 
improper fi rings, forty-four instances in which 
Wal-Mart threatened employees if they joined 
a union, fi fty-nine charges involving improper 
surveillance, and another fi fty-nine asserting that 
Wal-Mart illegally interrogated its associates to 
determine their views on sensitive labor related 
issues. In all, ninety-four of these complaints 
were weighty enough to generate a formal NLRB 
complaint against the corporation. 
What distinguishes the current organizing climate from 
previous decades of employer opposition to unions? Th e 
primary diff erence is that the most intense and aggres-
sive anti-union campaign strategies, the kind previously 
found only at employers like Wal-Mart, are no longer 
reserved for a select coterie of extreme anti-union em-
ployers. In examining NLRB documents we discovered 
dozens of employers similar to Earthgrains—companies 
with a history of maintaining a stable collective bargaining 
relationship with the majority of their workforce—making 
a dramatic shift in how they respond to union organizing 
eff orts. When faced with an organizing campaign in its 
London, Kentucky plant in the summer of 2000, Earth-
grains unleashed a relentless campaign of threats, inter-
rogations, surveillance, harassment, and intimidation 
against the union.2 The charges against Earthgrains 
included videotaping workers as they spoke to union 
representatives; maintaining and showing to workers a list 
that supposedly revealed how other workers were going to 
vote; interrogating workers about whether they or their 
co-workers supported a union; threatening to fi re workers 
for union activity; managers forcibly removing union 
literature from the hands of employees while they were on 
break; threatening to eliminate entire shifts, take away 
retirement plans, or gain-sharing benefi ts if the union 
won in the plant; telling the workers the union would go 
on strike as soon as the election was won; and promising 
improvements in benefi ts and a committee to resolve 
grievances if the union lost (Ahearn 2000). 
 Th e corporate anti-union strategy used in the Earth-
grains campaign had an enormous emphasis on interroga-
tion, surveillance, harassment, threats, and fear. Whereas 
these aggressive tactics have normally been associated with 
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only the most extremely anti-union fi rms, the examples of 
Earthgrains and similar employers demonstrate that trend 
is changing. Th ese trends show us that in today’s organizing 
climate, even employers with no prior history of waging 
war against unions are increasingly running extremely 
aggressive anti-union campaigns with great success. 
 Th e changing behavior by companies such as Earth-
grains raises several key questions critical to the labor 
policy debate currently before Congress. Has the nature 
and intensity of employer opposition changed over the 
last decade? Has the NLRB or the court system changed 
their interpretation or enforcement of the law in ways 
that might account for these changes in employer be-
havior? How does labor law need to be reformed in 
order to restore the promise embodied in Section 7 of 
the NLRA that workers have the right to organize and 
bargain fi rst agreements?
 For the past 20 years the primary focus of my research 
agenda has been to answer just these kinds of questions 
through a series of empirical studies examining the role 
of employer behavior and NLRB practice and policy in 
determining NLRB election certifi cation of election out-
comes. Combined, this research makes up the only ex-
tant national data on legal and illegal employer behavior 
during union election campaigns over time, controlling 
for election environment, company characteristics, union 
tactics, and bargaining unit demographics.3 Th is report is 
the product of my most recent study, which set out both 
to update my earlier work and expand on it by doing a 
full Freedom of Information Act request (FOIA) from the 
NLRB for all unfair labor practice documents relating to 
the election sample. 
Methodology and data
Th is study examines employer behavior in NLRB elec-
tions in the private sector as well as the process for fi ling 
charges of unfair labor practices to protect workers’ rights 
to organize free from coercion, intimidation, and retalia-
tion from employers.4 It is based on a random sample of 
1,004 NLRB campaigns taken from the full population of 
all certifi cation elections in units with 50 or more eligible 
voters between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003 
(BNA Plus 2000; 2002; 2004).5 (Hereafter, this paper will 
refer to this broad set of 1,004 elections as the “NLRB 
election sample.”) Using in-depth surveys with the lead 
organizer conducted by mail, phone, or email, personal 
interviews, documentary evidence, and electronic data-
bases, we compiled detailed data on election background, 
organizing environment, bargaining unit demographics, 
company and union characteristics and tactics, and elec-
tion and fi rst contract outcomes.
 We believe that the methods we used have been 
proven to be the most effective means for collecting 
data on employer behavior in organizing campaigns 
(see Appendix). It would be preferable if scholars could 
interview workers in the aftermath of each organizing 
campaign and fi nd out how the employer campaign had 
aff ected their vote. However, as indicated by the paucity 
of this kind of research on any scale, there are signifi -
cant barriers to conducting such research. Most obvious is 
that the same climate of fear and intimidation that sur-
rounds the certification election would influence how 
workers would respond to any survey. Workers would 
fear that the employer would figure out how they were 
answering the survey, just as they seemed able to deter-
mine which way workers intend to vote in elections. It 
would be extremely diffi  cult to gain approval for such 
research from any university human subjects institutional 
review board because of the risks to the worker. Th e second 
problem is a matter of scale. Getting even modest funding 
for research on organizing is extremely diffi  cult, but to 
conduct a study that would be representative of a broad 
enough cross-section of workers from diff erent kinds of 
industries, unions, and employer campaigns would require 
an extremely large sample and a very labor intensive survey 
process, with the probability of a very small return rate. 
So instead, most research involves individual voter studies 
that poll unorganized workers about how they think 
employers would react to an organizing attempt.
 Some critics have raised questions as to the reliability 
of union organizers as a data source. Th is question is an-
swered by the consistency of our fi ndings over time and by 
the fact that the organizer fi ndings have been confi rmed 
repeatedly by NLRB decisions and transcripts, primary 
campaign documents, fi rst contracts, and newspaper reports. 
Also, it is simply not possible to use employers as an alter-
nate source. As we have demonstrated in previous studies, 
the overwhelming majority of employers are engaging in 
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at least one or more illegal behaviors (at minimum 75% 
of the employers in the current sample are alleged to have 
committed at least one illegal action). Not only would it 
be next to impossible to get employers to complete sur-
veys in which they honestly reported on illegal activity, 
but that kind of question would not be permitted by uni-
versity institutional review boards since it might put the 
subjects at risk of legal action. Our past survey research 
has shown that surveying lead organizers, combined with 
collecting supporting documentary evidence (such as 
employer and company campaign literature, newspaper 
articles, campaign videos, unfair labor practice docu-
ments, and on-line information about company strategy, 
ownership, and fi nancial conditions) is a reliable method 
for answering these questions. We decided, however, that 
we would impose an even higher standard on the research 
data. Instead of sending out a one-time FOIA request to 
the NLRB based on whatever surveys were returned and 
accepting whatever documents we received, we made it 
a priority to get all available unfair labor practice docu-
ments for every case in our sample whether or not a survey 
was returned. Th is then would be the fi rst comprehensive 
database examining the current practice of the NLRB in 
processing ULP charges, all the way from charge sheets 
through court decisions. Equally important, for those 
cases where we had both survey data and unfair labor 
practice data, we would be able to analyze the relation-
ships between employer behavior, election outcomes, and 
the processing of ULP charges, and the implication of 
these relationships for the labor law reform debate.
 Surveys were completed for 562 of the 1,004 cases in 
the sample, for a response rate of 56% (Table 1).  We refer 
to these data as our “survey data” and the full sample of 
1,004 cases as the “NLRB election sample.” Furthermore, 
we were able to collect corporate ownership structure 
information—such as parent company name and base 
country; non-profi t or for-profi t status; whether the com-
pany is publicly or privately held; countries or regions of 
sites, operations, suppliers and customers; whether other 
units or sites are unionized—for all of the cases, and at 
least partial fi nancial information for 75% of those in our 
sample. We also ran summary statistics across several key 
variables, such as union and industry, to ensure that the 
sample was representative of the population of all NLRB 
certifi cation elections in units of 50 or more voters that 
took place in 1999-2003 (BNA Plus 2003; 2004).  
Unfair labor practice documents
We collected unfair labor practice documents from 
the NLRB for two purposes. First, we wanted to know 
whether the same trends we were fi nding in the most 
egregious behavior in the organizer surveys would refl ect 
the most common allegations found in the ULP charges 
fi led and upheld in whole or in part in settlements and 
NLRB dispositions. Second, we wanted to document 
NLRB practice and function in processing ULP charges 
in the current organizing climate, and the implications 
that their current methods and practices have for labor 
law reform.
 Our goal in this process was to collect the full spec-
trum of ULP documents relating to each election in our 
sample. To do this, we fi rst obtained data from the NLRB 
Case Activity Tracking System (CATS) to prepare a Free-
dom of Information Request for all legal documents 
relating to unfair labor practices tied to the elections 
in our sample. Th e request specifi cally included charge 
sheets, letters of withdrawal, no merit determinations, 
settlement agreements, complaints, Administrative Law 
Judge decisions, NLRB decisions, court decisions, and all 
other related documents for the elections in our sample. 
For those cases that had been closed because more than 
six years had passed, we requested and received the charge 
sheet and a letter from the NLRB outlining the disposi-
tion of the case.7 Once surveys had been returned, we also 
sent an amended FOIA request that included all the cases 
in our survey sample where organizers reported a ULP 
charge had been fi led but the ULP did not show up in the 
CATS database, either because of a change in the company 
name or a data-entry error in the database. We have 
gotten responses from every region of the NLRB, covering 
99% of our original FOIA request sample and 98% of the 
amended request from the survey sample.8 
 Given the extent of the ULP documents received, 
it might seem that they, rather than organizer survey 
responses, should be used as the sole or preferred measure 
of illegal employer behavior. However, as previous re-
search has shown (Bronfenbrenner 1997b; 2000; Compa 
2004) while unfair labor practice prosecutions can help 
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T A B L E  1
Summary data from NLRB election survey and 
unfair labor practice data collection
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s survey of NLRB elections 1999-2003; Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of NLRB ULP documents, 1999-2003 NLRB election sample.
All years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of elections in total sample    1,004      248       218      198       174       165
   Percent of total sample   100% 25% 22% 20% 17% 17%
   Percent win rate in sample 45 41 45 43 47 48
Survey data
 Percent surveys returned 56% 50% 49% 64% 55% 67%
       Percent by mail 39 48 39 43 33 32
       Percent by phone 26 27 23 21 26 32
       Percent by Web 33 22 38 34 38 33
       Percent by fax 2 2 1 2 3 3
    Percent win rate for returns 47 47 49 44 53 45
ULP data – full sample
   Percent of sample with ULP charges 40% 32% 44% 40% 43% 42%
   Total response rate from FOIA 
   (for all elections with ULP charges) 98 100 98 96 96 96
   Percent full documents received 57 23 41 65 84 78
   Percent partial documents received 21 34 33 13 11 13
   Percent ULP charges confi rmed but  
   documents reported destroyed 14 39 12 7 0 0
   Percent still awaiting NLRB response 5 5 10 9 4 4
   Percent no records found 3 0 4 6 1 4
ULP  data – sample with survey responses
   Percent of sample with ULP charges 39% 28% 41% 38% 47% 27%
   Total response rate from FOIA 
   (for all elections with ULP charges)  98 100 99 96 97 96
   Percent full documents received 58 19 41 65 85 76
   Percent partial documents received 21 38 33 17 7 15
   Percent ULP charges confi rmed but
   documents reported destroyed 11 36 12 6 0 0
   Percent still awaiting NLRB response      7 6 10 6 7 4
   Percent no records found 4 0 4 6 2 6
capture the nature and intensity of employer opposition 
to union activity, and while monitoring ULPs over time 
can help track changing patterns in employer behavior, 
ULPs are inadequate for measuring the totality of em-
ployer behavior. 
 First, unions are hesitant to fi le charges when there 
is a high probability that they are going to win the elec-
tion because the employer can use the ULP charges to 
indefi nitely delay or block the election. Even in the case of 
discharges for union activity (one of the most egregious 
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ULPs), unions often wait until after the election (as 
long as it is within the six-month fi ling period) to see 
if they are able to negotiate reinstatement before fi ling 
a charge. Given the long time that it takes to litigate a 
ULP case to conclusion, and the relatively weak relief 
available even for employees who ultimately win their 
cases, the statutory scheme does not provide strong in-
centives for workers to pursue such charges. As Lance 
Compa (2004, 68) explains:
In practice, many discriminatory discharge cases 
are settled with a small back-pay payment and 
workers’ agreement not to return to the work-
place. At a modest cost and with whatever minor 
embarrassment comes with posting a notice, the 
employer is rid of the most active union supporters, 
and the organizing campaign is stymied.
Alternatively, in cases where the union lost the election 
badly, organizers reported to us that they had consider-
able diffi  culty getting workers to come forward and testify 
because they were afraid of retribution from the employer. 
Furthermore, workers are keenly aware that even in cases 
with egregious employer violations, the most likely penalty 
is a posting and a small amount of back pay, which could 
take more than two years from filing the charge to a 
final Board decision to collect (Organizer interviews 
2008; Compa 2004). Th erefore, the incentive to pursue 
such cases is limited.
 And finally many union ULP victories are not 
captured in NLRB or court determinations but rather in 
informal settlements that occur after charges are fi led but 
before the merit determination (the issuance of a formal 
complaint by the NLRB’s general counsel) takes place, 
or after the election as part of the fi rst contract process. 
Th us, with less than half of all illegal employer violations 
captured by ULPs, they are best used in combination with 
other measures to assess the totality of the changing 
nature of employer opposition. 
The decline of organizing under 
the NLRB
In 1970, 276,353 workers organized through NLRB elec-
tions. Th ere were a total of 7,733 elections that year. Th e 
win rate was 55%, and 49% of the eligible voters even-
tually gained union representation. Outside of several 
thousand railway and airlines employees who would have 
organized that year under the Railway Labor Act, and 
construction and entertainment industry workers who 
have rarely organized through the traditional NLRB 
process due to the short-term nature of their employ-
ment markets, those 276,353 workers represented close 
to the totality of the private-sector workforce organizing 
that year (Pavy 1994). Th e 1970s also saw the beginning 
T A B L E  2
NLRB representation elections, 1999-2007
SOURCE: BNA Plus 2003; 2008.
Year
Number of
elections
Percent 
win rate
Number of
eligible voters
Number in
elections won
Percent of voters
in elections won
1999 3,108 52% 243,720 106,699 44%
2000 2,826 53 212,680 93,346 44
2001 2,361 54 193,321 68,718 36
2002 2,724 59 189,863 72,908 40
2003 2,351 58 150,047 77,427 52
2004 2,363 59 166,525 84,838 51
2005 2,137 61 125,305 64,502 52
2006 1,657 61 112,598 59,841 53
2007 1,510 61 101,709 58,376 57
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of the fi rst big wave of organizing in the public sector. 
Although there are no offi  cial records of the total number 
of public-sector workers organized in the 1970s, we can 
assume that at least 50,000 to 100,000 new public-
sector workers were added each year. Still, the majority 
of workers who organized into unions did so through the 
NLRB (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995).
 By 1987, when I conducted my fi rst study of employer 
behavior, unions won only 1,610 elections out of 3,314 
(49%), and the number of workers organized under the 
NLRB had plummeted to 81,453 (Pavy 1994). Th e NLRB 
as a means to organize was already in grave danger. 
 Twenty years later in 2007, the number of workers newly 
obtaining union representation through all possible mech-
anisms averaged somewhere between 600,000-800,000 
workers a year.9 At least 400,000 are public sector, 7,000- 
25,000 are under the Railway Labor Act depending on 
the year, and the rest are in the private sector. But as ex-
plained in Table 2, a diminishing portion, now less than 
20%, of new workers organized in the private sector are 
using the means established for them by law to organize—
the National Labor Relations Act. 
 In 2007, out of 101,709 workers who voted in NLRB 
elections, only 58,376 workers wound up with union 
representation. For years fewer and fewer workers have 
tried to use the NLRA, and fewer have been successful.10 
Th at is not to say that hundreds of thousands of workers, if 
not millions, are not trying to organize under the NLRB. 
To the contrary, many begin the NLRB process but 
eventually give up along the way because the odds are so 
stacked against them. Based on these fi ndings and those 
discussed above, we conclude that the certifi cation elec-
tion process, as established by the Taft-Hartley Act and 
as it has been enforced by the NLRB and the courts, has 
failed to function as the legislation was originally intended. 
As mentioned earlier, opinion polling has consistently 
shown that the majority of private-sector workers want 
unions, but they do not see a safe and viable means to 
get representation (Freeman 2007; Hart 2005). Without 
reform, the NLRA no longer serves as a viable mechanism 
for workers to obtain union representation. Our fi ndings 
explain why this is so. 
Threats, interrogation, promises, 
surveillance, and retaliation for 
union activity
Over the last two decades there has been a gradual evolu-
tion in employer tactics during NLRB certifi cation elec-
tion campaigns. In the 1970s and 1980s, employers took 
the initiative, hiring consultants and pulling together 
many of the basic elements of the anti-union “tool-kit” 
that still make up the core of most employers’ strategies 
today. But these tactics have not remained constant. Over 
time they have changed in both sophistication and inten-
sity as employers adapted to changing economic, trade, 
and investment climates as well as changes in the political 
and regulatory environment. Similarly, as unions made 
strategic responses to these same changes, employers re-
sponded in kind with new initiatives to counter them. 
 Table 3 provides summary statistics on the full range 
of employer behavior data we collected in the NLRB 
survey. Th ese fi ndings capture the breadth and extent of 
employer opposition to organizing while also suggesting 
how employers continuously capitalize on the changing 
environment and use it to their advantage. We have grouped 
these tactics into the following categories: threats, interroga-
tion, and surveillance; fear, coercion, and violence; retalia-
tion and harassment; promises, bribes, and improvements; 
election interference; and public campaigns.
 In combination, these numbers reveal a chilling 
pattern. First, they show that the overwhelming majority 
of employers—either under the direction of an outside 
management consultant or their own in-house counsel—
are running aggressive campaigns of threats, interroga-
tion, surveillance, harassment, coercion, and retaliation. 
Second, these tactics, both individually and in tandem, 
are part of a highly sophisticated, carefully crafted strategy 
that has withstood the test of time.
 Under the free speech provisions of the NLRA, em-
ployers have control of the communication process, and as 
shown in Table 3, in today’s organizing climate they take 
full advantage of that opportunity to communicate with 
their employees through a steady stream of letters, leafl ets, 
emails, digital electronic media, individual one-on-one 
meetings with supervisors, and mandatory captive-audience 
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Employer tactics in NLRB elections, 1999-2003
Election win rate when employer tactic:
Percent or mean
of elections used not used
Employer mounted a campaign against the union 96% 48% 72%
Hired management consultant 75% 43% 52%
Employer use of threats, interrogation, and surveillance
Held captive audience meetings 89% 47% 73%
     Number of meetings    10.4 - -
     More than 5 meetings 53% 47% 48%
Mailed anti-union letters 70% 46% 59%
     Number of letters   6.5 - -
     More than 5 letters 28% 49% 45%
Distributed anti-union leafl ets 74% 46% 59%
    Number of leafl ets               16.2 - -
    More than 5 leafl ets 61% 46% 51%
Used E-mail communications   7% 49% 53%
Used anti-union DVDs/videos/Internet 41% 39% 57%
Held supervisor one-on-ones 77% 48% 56%
     One-on-ones at least weekly 66% 48% 54%
     Used them to interrogate workers 63% 49% 51%
     Used them to threaten workers 54% 49% 50%
Used any type of surveillance 14% 58% 48%
Used electronic surveillance 11% 57% 49%
Attempted to infi ltrate organizing committee 28% 44% 51%
Interrogated workers about union activity 64% 49% 52%
Threatened cuts in benefi ts or wages 47% 51% 48%
Threats of plant closing 57% 45% 53%
     Actually closed plant after the election 15% 56% 44%
Threatened to fi le for bankruptcy   3% 63% 49%
     Filed for bankruptcy   0% 50% 50%
Threatened to report workers to INS   7% 34% 51%
     Actually referred workers to INS   1% 17% 50%
     Made random document checks   3% 56% 49%
Fear, coercion, and violence
Employer used events of 9/11 or national security   2% 57% 50%
Used guards, put up security fencing, or cameras 14% 50% 50%
Brought police into the workplace 21% 46% 51%
Police arrested workers on site   0%   0% 50%
Employer instigated violence and blamed union   7% 45% 50%
Retaliation and harassment
Discharged union activists 34% 49% 50%
    Number discharged     2.6 - -
    Workers not reinstated before election 29% 47% 72%
cont. on page 11
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SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s survey of NLRB elections, 1999-2003.
Election win rate when employer tactic:
Percent or mean
of elections used not used
Other harassment and discipline of union activists 41% 55% 49%
Transferred pro-union activists out of the unit   5% 64% 49%
Laid off  bargaining unit members   5% 50% 50%
    Number laid off              32.6 - -
Contracted out bargaining unit work  3% 71% 49%
    Number of jobs contracted out              34.0 - -
Alteration in benefi ts or working conditions 22% 49% 53%
Promises, bribes, and improvements
Granted unscheduled raises 18% 49% 50%
Made positive personnel changes 27% 47% 51%
Made promises of improvement 46% 44% 54%
Used bribes and special favors 22% 47% 51%
Held company social events 16% 50% 50%
Established employee involvement program 15% 39% 50%
Upgraded health & safety conditions   7% 43% 50%
Promoted pro-union activists 11% 57% 49%
Election interference
Solicitation/distribution rules 10% 43% 50%
Employer used NLRB-like front group 11% 54% 49%
Assisted anti-union committee 30% 41% 53%
Public campaign
Ran media campaign 12% 43% 51%
    Use free mass media   8% 35% 51%
    Purchased time on paid media   3% 41% 50%
Involved community leaders/politicians   6% 46% 50%
Other tactics
Distributed pay stubs with dues deducted 23% 42% 52%
Distributed union promise coupon books 22% 44% 51%
Held raffl  es relating to union dues   3% 32% 50%
Filed ULP charges against the union   3% 80% 49%
Filed election objections   8% 91% 46%
Intensity of employer campaign
Number of tactics used               10.9 - -
No tactics used   6% 72% 48%
Weak campaign  (1-4 tactics) 10% 65% 35%
Moderate campaign (5-9 tactics) 30% 40% 52%
Aggressive campaign (10 or more tactics) 54% 45% 55%
Employer tactics in NLRB elections, 1999-2003
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meetings with top management during work time. Nearly 
90% of employers use captive audience meetings, holding 
on average 10.4 meetings a year. Seventy-seven percent 
hold supervisory one-on-ones, and two-thirds hold them 
at least weekly throughout the campaign. 
 But this is nothing new. For years these tactics have 
been the primary means through which companies 
make their case against unions (Bronfenbrenner 2000; 
2004). What stands out about these data is what they 
tell us about how the tactics are being used. Th ese data 
provide additional insight into the critical role played by 
supervisor one-on-ones as the primary means through 
which employers deliver threats and engage in interro-
gation. As shown in Table 3, employers use supervisor 
one-on-ones to threaten workers for union activity in 
at least 54% of campaigns and to interrogate workers 
about their union activity and that of coworkers in at 
least 63% of campaigns. In addition to interrogation, 
14% of employers use surveillance, primarily electronic 
(11%), and 28% of employers attempt to infi ltrate the 
organizing committee in order to learn more about 
union supporters and activity. 
 Table 3 shows that these threats take many forms. 
Fifty-seven percent of employers make plant closing 
threats, and 47% threaten wage or benefi t cuts. In 7% of 
all campaigns—but 50% of campaigns with a majority 
of undocumented workers and 41% with a majority of 
recent immigrants—employers make threats of referral to 
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE). 
 We also confi rmed new tactics involving fear, coer-
cion, and violence that organizing directors say are in-
creasingly common. Th ey include such actions as bringing 
in security guards, putting up fencing, and putting 
in security cameras (14%), bringing in police to walk 
through the plant (21%), or instigating violence and 
trying to put the blame on the union (7%). However, 
despite the substantial number of police walkthroughs, 
none of the cases in our survey sample included any 
arrests, which makes the use of the police appear to be 
merely one more coercive strategy rather than refl ecting 
any legitimate security concern. 
 In combination, these more aggressive coercive 
actions—threats of plant closure, referrals to ICE, benefi t 
cuts, police walk-throughs, turning the workplace into an 
armed camp—send a clear message to workers: those who 
choose to move forward with the union do so at great 
personal risk. Employers send an even stronger message 
when they follow through on their threats with direct 
retaliation and harassment for union activity, such as 
when they actually refer workers to ICE (7% of all units 
with undocumented workers); discharge workers for union 
activity (34%); issue suspensions, written warnings, close 
supervision, and verbal abuse (41%); alter benefi ts or 
working conditions (22%); order layoff s (5%); contract 
out (3%); and transfer workers (5%). It is a message 
heard well beyond the workplaces where the organizing 
campaigns take place, discouraging not only the voters 
in that particular campaign, but holding back others 
from even attempting to get a campaign off  the ground 
(Hart 2005). 
 In addition to punitive strategies, employers continue 
to use softer, less overtly coercive tactics such as promises 
of improvement (46%); bribes and special favors (22%); 
the use of social events (16%); or the use of employee in-
volvement programs (15%). Th ese tactics have commonly 
been the reward for supporting or cooperating with the 
employer campaign, and in the past they have been among 
the most eff ective employer strategies (Bronfenbrenner 
1994; Rundle 1998). But it seems that in the current 
climate, such promises play a less central role because, as I 
have found in my research on global outsourcing, employers 
are willing and able to risk being more ruthless in their 
treatment of workers because they face fewer regulatory, 
economic, and social repercussions for doing so (Luce and 
Bronfenbrenner 2007; Bronfenbrenner 2000). 
 Employers also engage in tactics that directly interfere 
with the union campaign. Th e most common of these is 
assisting the establishment of an anti-union committee 
(30% of the campaigns). At least 10%11 of employers 
illegally issue rules for union communications and dis-
tribution of union materials that are diff erent from rules 
applied to other organizations and activities, while 11% 
have individuals who pose as agents of the NLRB spread 
misinformation among workers. 
 In this study’s data, most of the more extreme employer 
tactics—supervisor one-on-ones at least weekly, police 
walk-throughs, plant closing threats, promises, bribes, 
or assisting the anti-union committee—are associated 
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Changes in frequency and intensity of employer tactics over time
Proportion  of elections tactics employed in:
1986-87 1993-95 1998-99 1999-2003
Hired management consultant 72% 82% 76% 75%
Employer use of threats, interrogation, surveillance
Held captive audience meetings 82% 93% 92% 89%
    Average  number of  captive audience meetings      5.5     9.5    11.6   10.4
Mailed anti-union letters 80% 78% 70% 70%
     Average number of letters      4.5      5.4     6.7     6.5
Used E-mail communications       6%       7%
Distributed anti-union leafl ets 70% 81% 75% 74%
     Average number of leafl ets      6.0   10.8   13.3  16.2
Held supervisor one-on-ones 79% 82% 78% 77%
Used electronic surveillance 13%   6% 11%
Used anti-union DVDs/videos/Internet 63% 54% 41%
Threats of plant closing 29% 50% 52% 57%
     Actually closed plant after the election    2%   4%   1% 15%
Threatened to report workers to INS/ICE   1%   7%    7%
Retaliation and harassment
Discharged union activists 30% 32% 26% 34%
    Workers not reinstated before election 18% 21% 23% 29%
Other harassment and discipline of union activists   9% 41%
Alteration in benefi ts or working conditions 27% 17% 22%
Promises, bribes, and improvements
Granted unscheduled raises 30% 25% 20% 18%
Made positive personnel changes 38% 34% 27%
Made promises of improvement 56% 64% 48% 46%
Used bribes and special favors 42% 34% 22%
Held company social events   4% 28% 21% 16%
Established employee involvement program   7% 16% 17% 15%
Promoted pro-union activists 17% 16% 11% 11%
Other tactics
Assisted anti-union committee 42% 45% 31% 30%
Ran media campaign 10%   9%   5% 12%
Intensity of employer campaign
Number of tactics used by employer    5.0   8.2 7.2  10.9
No tactics    0%    3%   3%   6%
More than 5 tactics 38% 78% 63% 82%
More than 10 tactics    0% 26% 20% 49%
SOURCE: See Bronfenbrenner (1994) for the 1986-87 study, Bronfenbrenner (1997b) for the 1993-94 study, and Bronfenbrenner (2000) and 
                   Bronfenbrenner and Hickey (2004)  for the 1998-99 study .
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with union win rates several percentage points (between 
5 to 7) lower than in campaigns where they are not used. 
Compared to my previous studies, this gap between the 
win rates when tactics are utilized and when they are not 
has been closing (except for the most extreme tactics). Th is 
diff erence is most likely explained by the fact that em-
ployers are now sophisticated enough in their opposition 
strategies that they can often discourage union formation 
even without having to use these most aggressive tactics, 
thus only resorting to them for campaigns in which they 
feel the union has a good chance of winning. 
Changes in frequency and intensity 
of employer tactics over time
Table 4 presents data on the key tactics most commonly 
used by employers from our studies conducted over the 
last 20-plus years. Th ese include data from this study as 
well as 1986-87 (Bronfenbrenner 1993), 1993-95 (Bron-
fenbrenner 1996), and 1998-99 (Bronfenbrenner 2000). 
Although on the whole we fi nd the same list of tactics—a 
combination of threats, interrogation, promises, surveil-
lance, and retaliation for union activity—that employers 
have used for the last two decades, we fi nd in the last 
several years there has been certain shifting of focus, scale, 
and intensity in employer campaigns. Although the use 
of management consultants, captive-audience meetings, 
and supervisor one-on-ones has remained fairly constant, 
more recently we have seen an increase in more coercive 
and retaliatory tactics such as plant closing threats and 
actual plant closings, discharges, harassment and other 
discipline, surveillance, and alteration of benefi ts and con-
ditions. At the same time employers are not bothering as 
much with promises of improvements, as we see a gradual 
decrease in tactics such as granting of unscheduled raises, 
positive personnel changes, bribes and special favors, social 
events, and employee involvement programs. 
 With the exception of plant closing threats (which 
nearly doubled by increasing from 29% in 1986-87 to 
57% today) and discharged workers not being reinstated 
before the election (which gradually increased from 18% 
in 1986-87 to 29%), most of the increase in more coercive 
tactics occurred in the period since our last study. Dis-
charges for union activity have increased from 26% to 
34%, alterations in benefi ts or working conditions have 
increased from 17% to 22%, and other harassment and 
discipline of union activists from 9% to 41%.12   
 In contrast, the decline for the softer tactics began 
in the late 1980s or early 1990s, continuing through the 
present. Most of these tactics, including the granting of 
unscheduled raises, promises of improvement, and social 
events, dropped 10 to 2 percentage points, but some, 
including bribes and special favors, decreased as much as 
20 percentage points. It seems that most employers feel 
less need to bother with the carrot and instead are going 
straight for the stick. 
 Yet the employer behavior data tell a story that is more 
complex than simply a shift toward more coercive tactics. 
Our new fi ndings also show a consistent pattern across 
the data, namely that threats, interrogation, surveillance, 
harassment, and retaliation were the most common tactics 
across all the campaigns surveyed.
 As Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Paul Bogas describes 
in his decision regarding Rugby Manufacturing, these 
patterns are not random. Rugby’s anti-union campaign 
began after management was alerted to union activity and 
in response, “called its managers and supervisors together 
for a special Saturday meeting at which the attendees were 
instructed on techniques for discerning who was a union 
supporter.”13 Managers and supervisors were encouraged 
to casually broach the subject of unionization with their 
employees “in hopes that the employees would recipro-
cate by divulging their own sentiments” (Rugby 2002, 3). 
Th e results of these “conversations” were recorded on a 
chart detailing the contacts Rugby supervisors made with 
employees regarding the union. 
 Rugby “also engaged in frequent anti-union lobbying 
of individual employees” sometimes two or more times 
a day (Rugby 2002, 4). Th e engineering manager of the 
facility “gave daily anti-union speeches at the facility and 
stated that he was afraid the Respondent would close 
down if the employees unionized” (Rugby 2002, 4). 
Other managers and supervisors “warned employees that 
there could be negative repercussions if they discussed the 
Union among themselves” (Rugby 2002, 4). Th e consoli-
dated complaints issued against Rugby included serious 
labor law violations such as “terminating two employees, 
laying off  16 employees, and refusing to recall 15 of 
the laid-off  employees” because of union activity and to 
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discourage further union activity, off ering a promotion to 
the leading rank-and-fi le union activist (which he turned 
down), and “prohibiting employees from discussing union 
matters during company time, threatening employees 
regarding such discussions, maintaining a no-solicitation 
policy, and engaging in coercive interrogation” (Rugby 
2002, 1). Given the intensity and aggressiveness of the 
employer campaign, it is not surprising that the Steel-
workers lost the election 48 to 31 on November 30, 2000, 
just one month after they petitioned for the election. 
 Th e most important part of the Rugby story is not the 
most dramatic—the discharges and layoff s—but rather 
the full arc of the employer’s plan, which in fact started 
not with the meeting with the supervisors, but as Bogas 
points out in his decision, with its aggressive union-free 
policy. Th is policy was clearly outlined in the employee 
handbook, and read out loud to all new employees upon 
hiring. It made it clear that unions would not be tolerated, 
laying the groundwork for the aggressive and intense 
eff ort that followed. But the model that Rugby and so 
many others of these campaigns adopt is one in which 
the priority task of frontline supervisors is to ascertain 
through whatever means possible the leanings of every 
worker and then use the more aggressive retaliatory tactics 
to sway those leaning toward unionization.
 A case such as Rugby reminds us of the great de-
fi ciencies of the regulatory regime under which private-
sector workers organize in this country. Th e United Steel-
workers did fi le multiple unfair labor practices at Rugby 
for the discharges, interrogation, no solicitation policy, 
threats, layoff s, and denial of recall. It took a year to fi nally 
get a consolidated complaint, another year before the ALJ 
decision, and it was not until January 2003 (more than 
two years after the election) that the ALJ decision was fi -
nally enforced. Th e decision is what by NLRB standards 
would be considered “favorable” for the workers and the 
union. Rugby was found to have violated the NLRA on 
all charges except one of the discharges, and so was or-
dered to off er full reinstatement and a back pay award 
totaling more than $217,000 to be divided up among the 
16 workers who lost their jobs (one discharged and the 
rest laid off  and not recalled). In addition, Rugby had to 
post a notice in all its facilities stating it would cease and 
desist from all such violations from that point forward.14 
However, in a case like this, where two years had gone by 
before the fi nal NLRB decision, most laid-off  workers had 
had to leave town to fi nd employment and weren’t coming 
back. Ultimately, only one of the 16 union activists was 
reinstated, and the union was unable to win a second elec-
tion. In July 2007, six years after the workers fi rst tried 
to organize at Rugby, they did win representation with a 
diff erent union (NLRB Reports 2007), but 15 out of 16 
workers who had been wrongfully terminated for leading 
the fi rst organizing eff ort at Rugby, and had to move out 
of town to even fi nd another job, never obtained union 
representation at Rugby. 
 Th e Rugby story comprises the key elements of our 
new survey fi ndings. Employer campaigns have become 
more coercive, with an early emphasis on interrogation 
and surveillance to identify supporters, followed by threats 
and harassment to try to dissuade workers from supporting 
the unions, moving then to retaliation against employees 
who continue to move forward with the union campaign. 
Employers may still use promises, wage increases, social 
events, and other softer tactics, but with much less fre-
quency and not as the focus of their campaigns. 
Unfair labor practice fi ndings
Unions fi led unfair labor practice charges in 39% of the 
survey sample and 40% of the NLRB election sample 
(that was constructed by combining the CATS data and 
our FOIA request to the NLRB). For the surveys a 
total of 926 total allegations were fi led in all ULP charges 
combined, while for the full NLRB sample the total 
number of allegations totaled 1,387.15 Th e 39% ULP 
rate is higher than the 33% rate we found in our 2000 
study, but that is not surprising given the increase in more 
egregious employer anti-union behavior (e.g., discharges 
and wage/benefi t cuts), which can result in actual fi nan-
cial settlements rather than simply notice postings. Still, 
if we focus on the most common and serious employer 
anti-union tactics—threats, interrogation, surveillance, 
harassment, alteration of wages, benefi ts and/or working 
conditions, assistance or domination of the anti-union 
committee, and discharges or layoff s for union activity—
the survey results suggest that unions fi le ULP charges in 
fewer than half the elections where serious labor law viola-
tions occur. 
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Total number and percent of 
allegations fi led in returned surveys and full election sample
Allegations
Total 
allegations in
returned surveys
Percent in 
allegations in  
returned surveys
Total 
allegations 
in sample
Percent 
allegations 
in sample
Assistance or domination 12 1% 13 1%
Coercive statements and threats 173 19 248 18  
Denial of access 8 1 12 1 
Destroying authorization cards 1 0 1 0 
Discipline for union activity 66 7 95 7 
Discharge for union activity 161 17  265 19  
Disparagement 8 1 13 1 
Weingarten rights 2 0 2 0 
Harassment 41 4 57 4 
Imposing onerous assignments 40 4 50 4 
Interrogation 79 9 123 9 
Lawsuits for union activity 0 0 1 0 
Layoff  for union activity 11 1 23 2 
Misrepresentation 1 0 1 0 
Other rules 20 2 31 2 
Polling employees 11 1 16 1 
Promise of benefi ts 35 4 58 4 
Refusal to hire 3 0 4 0 
Retaliation for board participation 21 2 30 2 
Solicitation/distribution rules 44 5 66 5 
Statements of futility 23 2 34 2 
Surveillance 57 6 90 6 
Suspension for union activity 46 5 63 5 
Violence 1 0 2 0 
Wages or benefi ts altered for union activity 54 6 79 6 
Withholding promotions 2 0 2 0 
Bribery 1 0 2 0 
Impressions of surveillance 3 0 3 0 
Refusal to furnish information 1 0 1 0 
Refusal to recognize (Not Gissel) 1 0 1 0 
Subcontracting unit work 0 0 1 0 
Total allegations 926 100            1,387  100 
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of NLRB ULP documents, 1999-2003 NLRB election sample.
 Th e reasons workers and unions do not use the NLRB 
process to file charges every time a serious violation 
occurs are inherent in the process itself. As the Rugby case 
demonstrated, it is a process fraught with delays and risks 
to the worker, with extremely limited penalties for the 
employer, even in the most extreme cases. In a case where 
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there are just one or two serious allegations, especially if 
those allegations involve serious 8(a)1 violations (such as 
threats, surveillance, interrogation) but have no fi nancial 
penalties, then the risks and benefi ts of such fi lings must 
be weighed each time against the impact they could have 
on the election. For example, ULPs were not fi led in 32% 
of the elections with serious anti-union tactics in units 
where the election was won. Th at is most likely because 
fi ling charges can hold up the election for many months 
if not a year or more. Th us, except in the case of the most 
egregious violations (e.g., serious harassment, threats of 
referral to ICE, multiple discharges, or violence), unions 
typically wait until after the election to fi le charges. And 
if the election is won, unions often fi le charges only on 
8(a)3 violations that cannot be negotiated or settled with 
the employer as part of the fi rst contract process.
 Table 5 describes the nature and extent of the total 
allegations fi led in both the returned surveys and the full 
sample of 1,004 elections.16 It presents a wide spectrum of 
employer behaviors, but one that is extremely consistent 
between the full sample and the survey data, thus rein-
forcing the representativeness of the survey sample.
 Th e most common allegations are coercive statements 
and threats (19% of the allegations fi led in the survey 
sample, 18% of allegations fi led in the NLRB sample) 
and discharges for union activity (17% of allegations in the 
survey sample, 19% of allegations in the NLRB sample). 
Th e threats include threats of job loss, wage and benefi t 
cuts, transfers, referrals to ICE, violence, contracting out, 
sexual harassment or any other kind of coercive statement 
or action. Other common allegations include interroga-
tion (9%), other disciplinary actions (7%), surveillance 
(6%), wages or benefi ts altered for union activity (6%), 
solicitation distribution rules (5%), suspension for union 
activity (5%), harassment (4%), imposing onerous assign-
ments (4%), and the promise of benefi ts (4%). 
 Table 6 presents the fi nal disposition of the ULPs for 
the full NLRB election sample.17 Twenty-six percent of 
ULPs were withdrawn before merit determination, and 
23% were found to have no merit. Fourteen percent 
were settled in whole or in part before merit determina-
tion in either formal or informal settlements. Th ese pre-
complaint settlement agreements normally include some 
kind of posting, listing 8(a)1 violations and one or more 
8(a)3 violations, and a back-pay award (though typically 
without reinstatement). But that does not mean they are 
for minor violations. In most of these agreements the 
postings include a recitation of the same combination of 
T A B L E  6
Disposition of  unfair labor practice charges for full NLRB election sample
Disposition
Percent of allegations in 
NLRB election sample
Withdrew before merit determination 26%
No merit 23
Settlement in whole or in part prior to merit determination 14
Complaint issued 37
     Withdrew prior to hearing 2
     Settlement in whole or in part prior to hearing decision 18
     ALJ decision (loss) 1
     ALJ decision (Upheld in whole or in part) 1
     Board Order (Upheld in whole or in part) 9
     Board (loss) 3
     Federal Court (loss) 0
     Federal Court Order (Upheld at in whole or in part) 3
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of NLRB ULP documents, 1999-2003 NLRB election sample.
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threats, interrogation, discharges, surveillance, and solici-
tation rules that make up most of the complaints. Th e 
diff erence is that these employers decided to settle with 
the union rather than have the NLRB general counsel 
issue a complaint, and these workers and their union rep-
resentatives decided to take the settlement rather than risk 
either not getting a complaint or waiting a year or more 
for an ALJ decision. 
 Forty-fi ve percent of unfair labor practice charges 
fi led in the full sample resulted in either a settlement by 
the employer or a favorable decision by the NLRB or the 
courts.18 In 14% of the cases, the employer settled before 
a compliant was issued and in 37%, the NLRB issued a 
complaint. Additionally, another 18% of complaints were 
settled before the ALJ decision. Once a complaint has been 
issued, a higher percentage of employers settle and a higher 
percentage of those settlements involve full back pay and 
off ers of reinstatement as well as postings because, as our 
data show, once a case makes it past a complaint, only a 
very small percent lose. As a result, there is a great incentive 
for the employer to settle at this stage. However, there is 
equal pressure on the worker to settle because, as Table 
6 shows, even though only 1% of ALJ decisions are lost, 
only 1% are enforced at the ALJ level. Th e remainder of 
fi lings are appealed to the NLRB or the courts, often taking 
as much as two to three years to be resolved. In most pre-
hearing settlements, some but not all workers are off ered 
reinstatement, or workers are off ered some but not all of 
their back-pay. Th e workers’ alternative is to wait the full 
year or more for the ALJ decision, and as these data show, 
in most cases to wait for the appeal to the full NLRB. 
 We found several cases in our sample where the ALJ 
recommended a Gissel bargaining order, but in each 
case, the NLRB reversed the decision. Th e most dramatic 
of these was Abramson LLC, where the violations com-
mitted by the employer were so severe that they led 
Administrative Law Judge Lawrence W. Cullen to decide 
that a Gissel bargaining order should be issued retro-
active to when the union fi rst obtained majority status 
through signed authorization cards. He found there 
were “hallmark violations committed by [Abramson] 
including threats of plant closure and job loss, and 
threats of loss of substantial benefi ts by the elimination 
of transportation benefi ts, hotels, expense money, and 
per diems on out of town assignments.” Furthermore, 
these threats and actions emanated “from the highest 
level of management and resulted in a substantial reduc-
tion in Union support as evidenced by the overwhelming 
loss of support for the Union on election day from the 
peak of 54 cards signed in support of the Union” (345 
NLRB No.8, 23-24 (2005)). 
 If the company had not appealed the ALJ decision to 
issue the Gissel order, bargaining would have commenced 
within 10 days of Cullen’s decision. Instead the workers 
waited three more years only to have the NLRB overturn 
the bargaining order and instead order a second election. 
Part of the basis for the NLRB’s decision was that in three 
cases with “more serious and more pervasive unfair labor 
practices,” a bargaining order was not issued and tradi-
tional remedies were used instead. Th e NLRB reasoned 
that Abramson’s conduct was not bad enough to warrant 
a bargaining order if previous cases with worse behavior 
relied on traditional remedies and the running of a second 
election (345 NLRB No.8, 7 (2005)). Th e second election 
was lost. 
 The decision on which ULPs to settle and which 
to take to a higher level is partially determined by the 
type of allegation because, as shown in Table 7, certain 
types of allegations are much more likely to be found 
to have merit either singly or in combination with 
other allegations. 
 Th e job loss and wage and benefi t change allegations 
have the highest bar to overcome in the merit determi-
nation process, most likely because they both require 
individual workers to come forward and testify and also 
because those workers have to prove two things. First, that 
the employer is aware of their union activity, and second, 
that their union activity is the reason for the discipline, 
layoff , benefi t cut, or changed working conditions. But 
even if they make it past that phase, these cases tend to be 
pushed toward non-precedent making settlements rather 
than ALJ or NLRB decisions, in part because workers 
cannot aff ord to wait that long for reinstatement, and the 
back-pay quickly loses its value once money earned on 
other jobs is deducted. But the decisions also suggest that 
the bar to achieving a full NLRB win keeps being raised 
higher and higher each year, and that the NLRB is in-
creasingly likely to dismiss the serious allegations relating 
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T A B L E  7
Allegations by disposition for full NLRB election sample
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of NLRB ULP documents, 1999-2003 NLRB election sample.
Pre-merit 
loss
Pre-
merit 
settle-
ment MERIT DETERMINED—Complaint issued
Allegations
% 
Withdrew 
before
% 
No 
merit
%  
Settled
before, 
in
whole, 
or
in
part
% 
Withdrew 
after
% 
Settled 
after in 
whole 
or  in 
part
% 
ALJ 
Loss
% 
ALJ 
upheld 
in 
whole 
or in 
part
% 
Board 
loss
% 
Board 
upheld 
in 
whole 
or in 
part
% 
Court 
loss
% 
Court 
order 
upheld 
in 
whole 
or in 
part
Total 
loss
Total  
with 
charges 
settled 
or 
upheld 
in 
whole 
or in 
part
Coercive 
statements 
& threats     30%
    
17% 13%    1% 21%    1%      1%    2% 11%     0%    4% 50% 50%
Interrogation 26 11 14 3 29 1 0 3 7 0 5 45 55 
Polling 
employees 56 13 13 6 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 25 
Promise 
of benefi ts 25 18 18 4 27 0 2 2 4 0 0 49 51 
Surveillance 25 20 16 2 17 0 0 3 8 1 7 52 48 
Impressions 
of surveillance 33 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 67 
Other rules 13 13 20 3 10 0 0 13  13 0 13  43 57 
Solicitation/
distribution rules 13 14 14 2 27 2 2 0 14 0 14  30 70 
Statements 
of futility 21 6 21 3 36 0 0 0 9 0 3 30 70 
Bribery 50 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 
Disparagement 17 8 17 0 0 17 0 8 33 0 0 50 50 
Harassment 23 30 23 2 11 0 0 2 9 0 0 57 43 
Assistance or 
domination 23 31 8 0 15 0 0 0 15 0 8 54 46 
Discharge for 
union activity 27 36 10 2 14 0 1 3 7 0 0 68 32 
Discipline for 
union activity 16 30 15 3 17 1 0 5 8 0 4 56 44 
Suspension for 
union activity 24 33 13 3 17 0 0 2 8 0 0 62 38 
Layoff  for 
union activity 30 26 9 0 13 0 0 9 13 0 0 65 35 
Wages or 
benefi ts altered 31 23 17 0 15 0 1 0 13 0 0 54 46 
Imposing onerous 
assignments 33 25 17 2 13 0 0 2 4 0 4 63 38 
Retaliation 
for board 
participation 23 30 13 7 10 0 0 10 7 0 0 70 30 
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to threats of job and benefi t cuts or serious interrogation, 
harassment, and coercion, while sustaining the accusa-
tions around more minor solicitation and distribution 
rules, promises, and less coercive threats. 
 
The timing of employer 
anti-union activity
Another indication of the increased intensity of employer 
opposition is the timing of when ULP charges are fi led. 
As described in Table 8, 22% of all ULPs were fi led before 
the election petition was fi led, and 16% were fi led more 
than 30 days before the petition was fi led. Th us, we fi nd 
that nearly a quarter of the discharge ULPs (24%) were 
fi led before the petition, and 16% were fi led more than 30 
days before the petition. Similarly, 19% of ULPs relating 
to threats were fi led before the petition, including 14% 
fi led more than 30 days before, while 24% of interrogation 
ULPs, 31% of the assistance and domination ULPs, 16% 
of the surveillance ULPs, 25% of the solicitation/distri-
bution rules ULPs and 17% of the alteration of wages 
and benefi t ULPs were fi led more than 30 days before the 
petition was fi led for the election. 
 Recognizing that the behaviors listed in the ULP 
charge had to have occurred days if not weeks before the 
T A B L E  8
Percent of allegations fi led prior to the petition being fi led
Allegations
Percent of allegations 
fi led prior to petition
Percent of allegations 
fi led before 30 days
prior to petition
Percent of allegations 
fi led within 30 days 
prior to petition
Assistance or domination     31%    31% 0%
Coercive statements and threats 19 14 5 
Denial of access 25 25 0 
Discharge for union activity 24 16 8 
Discipline for union activity 25 18 7 
Disparagement 17 17 0 
Harassment 26 16  10 
Imposing onerous assignments 18 13 5 
Interrogation 29 24 5 
Layoff  for union activity 14   5 9 
Misrepresentation 50   0 50  
Other rules 45 41 4 
Polling employees 13 13 0 
Promise of benefi ts 14 10 4 
Refusal to hire 25   0 25  
Retaliation for board participation   3   0 3 
Solicitation/distribution rules 30 25 5 
Statements of futility   9   6 3 
Surveillance 26 16 10
Suspension for union activity 24 17 7 
Violence 50 50 0 
Wages or benefi ts altered for union activity 20 17 3 
All allegations 23 16 6 
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of NLRB ULP documents, 1999-2003 NLRB election sample.
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actual charge was fi led, these data confi rm not only that 
a signifi cant amount of employer opposition is in place 
very early in many union campaigns, but that employer 
campaigning does not depend on an election petition to 
kick into eff ect.
 Ultimately, this brings us back from the ULP data 
to the employer behavior data. For it is important to 
remember the diff erence between the extent of employer 
opposition documented by union organizers, and those 
violations they chose to fi le charges on with the NLRB, 
and then again, what, if anything, they gained from 
fi ling those charges even when they prevailed. Figure A 
compares the most serious illegal employer behavior 
reported on the survey: interrogation, threats, harassment 
and other discipline, alterations in wages, benefi ts, or con-
ditions for union activity, discharges for union activity, 
assistance or domination of union, promises of benefi ts, 
and all serious allegations.19 Although as shown in Figure A, 
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s survey of NLRB elections, 1999-2003; Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of NLRB ULP documents, 1999-2003 NLRB election sample.
F I G U R E  A
Survey responses, ULP allegations, and ULPs settled or 
upheld by elections in survey sample
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SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s survey of NLRB elections, 1999-2003.
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the employer tactics and the charges fi led followed the 
same pattern, unions failed to fi le charges in more than 
half of the elections where they reported that employers 
committed serious labor law violations. Th e allegations 
were upheld or settled in whole or in part in fewer than 
half the ULPs that they fi led. 
 As these data have shown, the choice not to use the 
NLRB process is a rational one. Already discouraged by 
threats, harassment, and retaliation in the organizing cam-
paign itself, workers have good reason to believe they are at 
risk, yet they can expect little gain even if they do prevail. 
 Even if the union succeeds in making it through the 
hoops of fi re that it takes to win the election, Figure B 
shows that it will be many years before a union ever ob-
tains a collective bargaining agreement. Within one year 
after the election, only 48% of organized units have col-
lective bargaining agreements. By two years it increases 
to 63% and by three years to 70%. Only after more than 
three years will 75% have obtained a fi rst agreement. 
Given that many workers had to wait many months—if 
not years—to schedule an election, they should not have 
to wait years to get a fi rst contract.
 For all the eff ort they go through, we know that fewer 
than 60,000 workers end up in a unit where an election is 
won, and fewer than 40,000 in a unit with a fi rst contract. 
Worse yet, for many it is a process that can take as long 
as three to fi ve years of threats, harassment, interrogation, 
surveillance, and, in some cases, job loss. 
 But it does not have to be this way. We know from the 
last two decades of United States public-sector organizing 
experience that there are alternative models in place to 
help us develop a framework that can make it possible for 
private-sector workers in the U.S. to organize without 
going through the trial by fi re that they now endure. 
Table 9 displays the stark contrast between employer be-
havior under the NLRB and employer behavior in state 
and local elections and card check certifi cations in the 
public sector (in this case New York, Minnesota, Florida, 
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T A B L E  9
Comparison of employer opposition in public and private-sector campaigns
Percent of elections
NLRB 1999-2003 Public 1999-2003
Election campaigns 100% 83%
    Election win rate 45% 84%
Card check campaigns 0% 17%
    Card check win rate -                   100%
No employer campaign 4.0% 48%
Hired management  consultant 75% 23%
Employer use of threats, interrogation, and surveillance
Held captive audience meetings 89% 22%
    Number of meetings 10.4     9.47
Mailed anti-union letters 70% 21%
     Number of letters      6.54     2.64
Distributed anti-union leafl ets 74% 22%
    Number of leafl ets 16.2   4.1
Held supervisor one-on-ones 77% 26%
    One-on-ones at least weekly 66%   2%
    Used them to interrogate workers 63% 20%
    Used them to threaten workers 54% 15%
Used E-mail communications   7% 14%
Attempted to infi ltrate organizing committee 28%   6%
Threatened cuts in benefi ts or wages 47% 14%
Used electronic surveillance 11%   2%
Used anti-union DVDs/videos/Internet 41%   1%
Made plant closing threats 57%   3%
    Actually closed plant after the election 15%   0%
Fear, coercion, and violence
Used guards, put up security fencing, or cameras 14%   5%
Brought police into the workplace 21%   6%
Retaliation and harassment
Alteration in benefi ts and working conditions 22%   3%
Discharged union activists 34%   3%
Other harassment and discipline of union activists 41% 13%
Laid off  bargaining unit members   5%   1%
    Number laid off 32.6 5
Contracted out bargaining unit work   3%   5%
    Number of jobs contracted out 34 1
cont. on page 24
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T A B L E  9  ( C O N T . )
Comparison of employer opposition in public and private-sector campaigns
Percent of elections
NLRB 1999-2003 Public 1999-2003
Promises, bribes, and improvements
Established employee involvement program 15%   9%
Made positive personnel changes 27%   9%
Made promises of improvement 48% 12%
Granted unscheduled raises 18%   7%
Promoted pro-union activists 11%   2%
Used bribes and special favors 23%   2%
Held company social events 16%   1%
Other tactics
Assisted anti-union committee 30%   8%
Used media campaign 12%   7%
Involved community leaders/politicians    6%   8%
Intensity of employer campaign
Number of tactics used by employer                          10.9                       2.7
    Employer used no tactics   6% 53%
    Employer ran a weak campaign (1-4 tactics) 10% 25%
    Employer ran a moderate campaign (5-9 tactics) 30% 14%
    Employer ran an aggressive campaign (10 or more tactics) 54%   7%
SOURCE: Bronfenbrenner’s analysis of Public Sector Survey data 1999-2003.
New Jersey, California, Illinois, and Washington). Five of 
the states in our sample—New York, New Jersey, Califor-
nia, Illinois, and Washington—have both card check and 
election certifi cation of ballots. 
 In 48% of the public-sector campaigns, the employer 
did not campaign at all—no letters, no leafl ets, no meetings. 
Th e entire decision was left up to the workers and the 
union. Th e remaining 52% of public employers did use 
some of the same tactics as private employers, but on an 
entirely diff erent scale. Th ree percent discharged workers 
for union activity or made unilateral changes in wages 
and benefi ts, 22% held captive audience meetings, and 
2% held supervisory one-on-ones at least weekly. Not 
surprisingly, both win rates and fi rst contract rates con-
tinue to remain much higher in the public sector, averaging 
84% overall. But in the few cases where unions are faced 
with moderate or aggressive employer opposition, the 
win rate plummets, suggesting that they are ill-prepared 
for the kind of opposition that has become routine under 
the NLRB.
Conclusion
When examined in combination, the survey data and the 
ULP data confi rm what many U.S. workers already know: 
Our labor law system is broken. Polling consistently shows 
that a majority of workers believe they would be better off  
if they had a union in their workplace (Teixeira 2007), but 
they also feel that they would be taking a great risk if they 
were to try to organize (Hart 2005). Th ey know intuitively 
what our data show—that the overwhelming majority of 
U.S. employers are willing to use a broad arsenal of legal 
and illegal tactics to interfere with the rights of workers 
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to organize, and that they do so with near impunity. Th e 
data show that: 
• 57% of employers threaten to shut down all or part of 
their facilities;
• One-third of employers fi re workers for union activity 
during NLRB certifi cation campaigns;
• 47% threaten to cut wages or benefi ts;
• 28% attempt to infi ltrate the organizing committee;
• 14% use surveillance;
• 22% off er bribes and special favors;
• 89% of employers require their workers to attend 
captive-audience meetings during work hours;
• 77% had supervisors regularly talk to workers one-
on-one about the union campaign, with a focus on 
threats of plant closings, wage and benefi t cuts, and 
job loss; and
• More than 60% use one-on-one meetings to inter-
rogate and harass workers about their support for 
the union. 
Th is combination of threats, interrogation, surveillance, 
and harassment has ensured that there is no such thing 
as a democratic “secret ballot” in the NLRB certifi cation 
election process. Th e progression of actions the employer 
has taken can ensure that the employer knows exactly 
which way every worker plans to vote long before the 
election takes place. In fact, as our data show, many of 
the employer campaigns were in full swing more than a 
month before the petition was even fi led. Although most 
of these actions are illegal, the penalties are minimal, usu-
ally a posting of a notice, at worst back-pay (maybe with 
interest and reinstatement for a fi red worker), and a re-run 
election. Even the most serious penalties—reinstatement 
for fi red workers, or Gissel bargaining orders—are all too 
often recommended by the ALJ and the General Counsel 
only to be reversed by the full NLRB. Th ere are no puni-
tive damages or criminal charges, and no extra penalties 
for repeat off enders. Th e most serious penalty—a bargaining 
order—simply gets the union to the fi rst contract process, 
in which the anti-union campaign often continues un-
abated or even escalates. 
 Social scientists study patterns. As a researcher who 
has closely examined the NLRB organizing process for 
more than 20 years, I fi nd the patterns of employer be-
havior appear deeply carved into our legal framework 
and employment practices. Th ey have become so deeply 
engrained that we as a society have begun to accept ille-
gal behavior as the norm, and for a long time now many 
workers have become resigned to the fact that no branch 
of government was going to listen to their pleas that the 
system was not just broken, but that it was operating in 
direct violation of the law. 
 In recent years, however, there seems to be a growing 
awareness of the failings of the law. In the three years we 
spent doing the work to collect and analyze data, Congress 
has begun considering far-reaching legislative reforms. We 
believe that our fi ndings can help inform that debate and 
support policies that could make the NLRA once again 
a labor law regime private-sector workers can rely on to 
exercise their right to organize. 
 Th e fi rst reform is the passage of the Employee Free 
Choice Act (EFCA). EFCA would provide a means to 
streamline the burdensome and terrifying obstacle course 
that the organizing and fi rst contract process has become, 
while also off ering more substantive penalties for the most 
egregious employer violations. Under EFCA, the NLRB 
would be required to automatically certify the union if the 
majority of the employees in a unit signed authorization 
cards designating the union as their bargaining representa-
tive. It would also establish a process for at least 30 days of 
mediation and then arbitration if one of the parties feels 
that continued bargaining is futile after at least 90 days of 
trying to reach an agreement. 
 EFCA would also create stronger penalties for labor 
law violations during organizing and fi rst contract 
campaigns. Th ese include making it a priority for the 
NLRB to seek federal court injunctions for discharges, 
discrimination, threats, and other interference with 
workers rights during organizing and fi rst contract 
campaigns. It also triples back-pay awards and provides 
for civil fi nes of up to $20,000 per violation for willful 
or repeat violations.
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 But EFCA is just a fi rst step in putting in place a 
labor policy that reestablishes workers’ rights to orga-
nize. We had a labor law on our books for the last 20 
years that U.S. employers have violated with impunity. 
And the same employers who are violating the NLRA 
are often in violation of health and safety, wage and 
hour, civil rights, and other employment and labor law 
standards. EFCA is a start to giving workers back their 
rights and protections under our labor and employ-
ment laws, but it will be up to Congress, policy groups, 
scholars, unions, concerned citizens, workers, and, yes, 
employers, to make sure that our regulatory agencies 
and the laws they enforce are once again living up to 
their legislative and historical mission to protect the 
rights of U.S. workers. Our country cannot aff ord a 
system where the only unionized workplaces are where 
workers are tough, brave, and lucky enough to make it 
through the campaign.
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Appendix: source and methodology overview
Th e prior research that informs and shapes this report in-
cludes four in-depth national studies of NLRB certifi ca-
tion elections in 1986-87, 1994, 1993-95, 1998-99, and 
research on elections, card checks, and voluntary recog-
nitions in state and local units in the public sector in a 
national sample covering all states in 1991-92 (see below). 
Combined, this research makes up the only extant national 
data on legal and illegal employer behavior during union 
election campaigns over time, controlling for election 
environment, company characteristics, union tactics, and 
bargaining unit demographics. By examining the eff ec-
tiveness of the NLRB in enabling workers to exercise their 
rights to organize and in restraining illegal employer and 
union behavior during the organizing process, my research 
found that employer opposition has reduced the ability of 
workers to organize under the NLRB. For comparative 
purposes I also conducted similar research looking at state 
and local elections in the public sector. 
 Th is report is the product of my most recent study, 
which set out both to update my earlier work and expand 
on it by doing a full Freedom of Information Act Request 
(FOIA) from the NLRB for all unfair labor practice 
documents relating to the elections in our sample. In 
combination these data allow us to provide an in-depth 
examination of the nature and extent of employer oppo-
sition to worker eff orts to organize under the NLRB, 
and the functioning of the unfair labor practice charge 
process in dealing with that behavior. I conclude that 
both the intensity and changing character of employer 
behavior, as well as the fundamental fl aws in the NLRB 
process, have left us with a system where workers who 
want to organize cannot exercise that right without fear, 
threats, harassment, and/or retribution.
 For the 1986-87 data and analysis, see Bronfen-
brenner (1994; 1997a ). For 1993-95, see Bronfenbrenner 
(1997b), and for 1994, see Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
(1998). For data and analysis of 1998-99, see Bronfen-
brenner (2000) and Bronfenbrenner and Hickey (2004). 
For the public-sector study of 1991-92 data, see Juravich 
and Bronfenbrenner (1998) and Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich 1995. For the purposes of this paper I will be 
focusing on data from the 1993-95 study rather than the 
1994 study because they overlap, and the 1993-95 study 
was more comprehensive.
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Endnotes
See Bronfenbrenner (1994) for the 1986-87 study, Bronfenbrenner 1. 
(1997b) for the 1993-94 study, and Bronfenbrenner (2000) and 
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey (2004) for the 1998-99 study. 
Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint, and Notice of 2. 
Hearing. Th e Earthgrains Company and BCTWGM, 9-CA-3872; 
9-CA-33901, October 27, 2007.
See this paper’s Appendix for details.3. 
Th e other parts of the study look at organizing under the Rail-4. 
way Labor Act (RLA), private-sector elections, voluntary recog-
nitions, and card check campaigns that occur outside the NLRB 
process, and state and local elections and card check certifi ca-
tions in the public sector for seven states: Minnesota, Illinois, 
Florida, Washington, California, New Jersey, and New York. 
Th e RLA and non-board data analysis will be completed later 
this year, while the data analysis for the public sector has been 
completed and we will include some of those fi ndings in this 
paper for comparative purposes.
See Bronfenbrenner (2005) at http://works.bepress.com/kate_bron-5. 
fenbrenner/14 for summary statistics on the population and a 
complete discussion on how the data for the population were 
compiled. We chose 1999-2003 to include some years before the 
economic downturn and to allow at least three years for the parties 
involved in all elections in the sample to process election objec-
tions and attempt to bargain a fi rst contract. We limit the sample 
to units with 50 or more eligible voters so there would be enough 
data to analyze the full spectrum of variables we are examining. 
A question might be raised as to whether that would impact on 
the representativeness of the ULP data for the overall population. 
We did examine the relationship between unit size and number of 
ULPs, and did not fi nd any consistent pattern between the size of 
the unit and the number or nature of the ULPs fi led. 
Th e only unions underrepresented in the returned surveys were 6. 
independent unions, in particular local independent unions 
(23% return rate for local independents, 33% for national and 
state independents). Th is was because, for quite a few of the local 
independents, the only listing we had from the NLRB was simply 
“LIND,” so we had no contact information. Even for those with 
contact information, many of the small independents went out 
of existence after losing the election, and there was no listing or 
person to contact. We do believe, however, that for the national 
independents that we did get a representative sample, since such a 
high percentage all come out of the same occupations and cluster 
of unions, and we were able to get returned surveys from a repre-
sentative cross section of the major national independent unions 
operating during that period, including the nurse unions, United 
Electrical Workers (UE), and the various security guard unions, 
several of which affi  liated with each other during the period of 
our study. 
Although we did not receive all the documents for every case, 7. 
we did get complete documents for 69% of the cases with ULPs 
in our full sample and 74% of the returned surveys. For the 
remaining 29% of the total sample and 24% of the survey cases 
with ULPs, where the full offi  cial records would normally have 
been destroyed by the NLRB because more than six years had 
gone by, we received at least a charge sheet and a letter describing 
the disposition of the case, or a letter describing the charges and 
disposition of the case, except for eight cases in the survey sample 
and two additional cases in the full sample where the NLRB was 
unable to fi nd any record of the case. For the 21% of those cases 
where the NLRB was only able to send us a charge sheet because 
the other records were destroyed, we then used the CA number to 
conduct an “Unfair Labor Practice (Complaint Case) Advanced 
Search” on the http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov Web site hosted by the 
NLRB to fi nd out the disposition for the case. Th is left us only 
with at most 22% of the survey cases and 22% in the total ULP 
sample that we were missing ULP data, and of those 11% of the 
survey cases and 14% of the full ULP sample cases had been con-
fi rmed by the NLRB as ULPs, but they reported to us all records 
had been destroyed.
In addition to reporting out the fi ndings from these data in this 8. 
report, summary data from these documents have been entered 
into a searchable database that will be made available to other 
scholars and researchers, making this the fi rst ever dataset of ULPs 
occurring during NLRB campaigns that is based on a national 
random sample. 
My estimates for the number of workers organizing in the public-9. 
sector and non-board campaigns came from the data we collected 
to create our population for the public-sector and non-board survey 
sample. For the public-sector survey we collected complete data 
from a cross section of fi ve states (later adding data from two other 
states). I used the data from the fi ve states that are representative 
of the types of public-sector elections from across the country 
and the range of election activity to estimate that the number 
of new workers organized averages 400,000 a year. Similarly, I 
used the numbers coming in to us from the non-board survey 
in our sample to come up with an estimate of 250,000-300,000. 
NMB election numbers average between 10,000 and 25,000 per 
year. Th us the total number of workers organized should range 
between 600,000-800,000 depending on the year. My numbers 
are consistent with those reported by the federations.
Just as this report went to press, the BNA released its 2008 elec-10. 
tion update. It showed that the total number of NLRB elections 
increased from 1,510 to 1,579, and the win rate increased from 
61% to 67%. However, the total number organized under the 
NLRB remained quite small at 70,511. Th is represents less than 
20% of the estimated 400,000 workers who organize each year in 
the private sector.
Th e actual percentage of employers who issued solicitation/distri-11. 
bution rules is likely much higher than 10% because we did not 
include a question about solicitation/distribution under the 
employer behavior section of the survey, but 10% of the respon-
dents reported on their surveys that they had fi led unfair labor 
practice charges regarding solicitation/distribution rules that were 
settled or upheld by the NLRB.
Although the data don’t show up in the table, we also found an 12. 
increase in interrogation, threats of benefi t cuts, harassment, and 
more onerous assignments, overtime, etc. We did not include 
specifi c questions in the surveys, but we did have a column for 
other and for comments on why the union lost the election in 
each of the four surveys. In addition, we had copies of primary 
employer campaign documents, unfair labor practice documents, 
and the detailed case summaries for the NAALC Trade Secretariat 
for the 1993-95 study (Bronfenbrenner 1996) and the U.S. Trade 
Defi cit Review Commission for the 1998-99 study (Bronfen-
brenner 2000). In combination, these data suggest a dramatic 
increase in interrogation, threats, discipline, harassment, and 
alteration of benefi ts and working conditions.
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Rugby Manufacturing and USW, ALJ Decision, Paul Bogus, 13. 
August 30, 2002, 18-CA-15-802; 18-CA-16154; 18-CA16475; 
18-CA16008: 3.
Settlement Correspondence Letters dated January 22, 2003, Rugby 14. 
Manufacturing, 18-CA-15802 et al.
Th e number of allegations fi led per election for the survey sample 15. 
ranged from 1 to 27 with a mean of 3.97 and a median of three, 
while the number of allegations per election for the full NLRB 
election sample ranged from 1 to 52 with a mean of 4.49 and a 
median of three. Th irty percent of all elections in both the survey 
sample and the full NLRB election sample had only one allega-
tion fi led, and 9% of the elections in the survey sample and 7% 
of the full NLRB election sample had 10 or more ULP allega-
tions. However, two serious discharge allegations can lead to an 
election being overturned, while 10 vague threats would easily be 
dismissed. Th us, it is content rather than number of allegations 
that matters the most.
Th ese percentages are not percent of elections but percent of the 16. 
1,387 allegations fi led that we have documented records for in the 
1,004 elections in our total sample and the 926 allegations fi led 
that we have documented records for in our survey sample. Th e 
handful of allegations that appear to be relating to a contract rather 
than election campaign are tied to organizing campaigns that 
occurred in units where employers had withdrawn recognition 
in previously organized units, and unions were litigating those 
cases while simultaneously running new organizing campaigns in 
the same units. Th is table does not include cases where we know 
ULPs were fi led but do not know the specifi c nature of the allega-
tions because the records were destroyed.
 We also ran the same data for the survey sample and compared 17. 
it against the disposition numbers for the NLRB election sample 
and found them to be consistent across every category.
MIT researcher John-Paul Ferguson collected ULP data for a 18. 
similar time period for his study on ULP charges from 1999-2004. 
Using the CATS data he made FOIA requests to the NLRB and 
received data confi rming ULPs for 20% out of more than 22,000 
ULPs (2008). Th e diff erence is not surprising given that we had 
a random sample of 1,004 elections rather than his much larger 
study, and we had full information to include with our FOIA 
requests on employer name, address, certifi cation date, election 
date, number of eligible voters, and election outcome. In addi-
tion, we allowed enough time to send two FOIA requests to the 
region and then a follow up FOIA request to both the Region 
and NLRB Headquarters. Most important, our response rate 
from the NLRB was 98% from our sample, thus suggesting that 
our numbers more accurately capture current ULP rates. Still, 
despite the diff erence in percentages, our overall fi ndings about 
the adverse impact that ULPs have on the election process serve to 
complement rather than contradict each other’s work.
Th e term “Th reats” includes all elections in which the employer 19. 
made threats of plant closing, benefi t cuts, and threats to report 
workers to INS/ICE. It also includes employer threats of fi lings 
for bankruptcy and threats made in supervisor one-on-ones. 
“Assistance” or “Domination” included cases in which employers 
assisted with the anti-union committee or used an NLRB-like 
front group.
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